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The Presumption of Irreparable Harm in Patent 
Infringement Litigation: A Critique of  
Robert Bosch LLC v. Pylon Manufacturing Corp. 
By Matthew C. Darch* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
¶1  On October 13, 2011, a three-judge panel of the Federal Circuit eliminated the 
presumption of irreparable harm for injunctive relief in patent infringement cases.
1
  This 
note criticizes that ruling and argues that the loss of exclusivity caused by continued 
infringement should create a rebuttable presumption of irreparable harm.   
¶2  Injunctive relief is a remedy available to patent holders who can show another 
product infringes their patent.
2
  Once a patent holder either establishes a likelihood of 
success on the merits of her claim, or actually prevails in proving infringement of a valid 
patent, the court determines whether an injunction is an appropriate remedy.
3
  When an 
injunction is sought, the court looks to four factors to determine whether to grant an 
injunction.
4
  One of these factors is “irreparable harm.”5  Prior to the decision in Robert 
Bosch LLC v. Pylon Manufacturing Corporation, upon showing infringement, a patent 
holder was entitled to the presumption that the holder would be irreparably harmed by 
continued infringement.
6
  However, the infringer could overcome this presumption by 
offering contrary evidence, and determination of the issue would be for the judge.
7
   
 
*
 Juris Doctor Candidate, Northwestern University Law School. 
1
 Robert Bosch LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 659 F.3d 1142, 1149 (Fed. Cir. 2011)  (“We take this 
opportunity to put the question to rest and confirm that eBay jettisoned the presumption of irreparable harm 
as it applies to determining the appropriateness of injunctive relief.”).  
2
 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2006) (“The several courts having jurisdiction of cases under this title may grant 
injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right secured by 
patent, on such terms as the court deems reasonable.”).   
3
 Id.   
4
 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (“According to well-established 
principles of equity, a plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test before a court 
may grant such relief.  A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that 
remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, 
considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; 
and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.”). 
5
 Id.  See also Teledyne Indus., Inc. v. Windmere Products, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 710, 739 (S.D. Fla. 1977) 
(“Harm is irreparable when it cannot be compensated adequately in money damages.”) (citing Nuclear-
Chicago Corp. v. Nuclear Data Inc., 465 F.2d 428 (7th Cir. 1972)). 
6
 Robert Bosch LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 659 F.3d 1142, 1149 (Fed. Cir. 2011).   
7
 See Roper Corp. v. Litton Sys., Inc., 757 F.2d 1266, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“The presumption does not 
change the ultimate equitable showing needed to justify a preliminary injunction.  Like most legal 
presumptions, it is rebuttable by clear evidence that it is overcome in the case at hand.”); see generally, 
Texas Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254–55 (1981) (holding once a presumption has 
been rebutted, the Court then considers the merits of the underlying claims); Routen v. West, 142 F.3d 
1434, 1440 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“However, when the opposing party puts in proof to the contrary of that 
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¶3  The following hypothetical case illustrates the issue: assume an inventor receives a 
patent for a better mousetrap.  The patent holder determines that another company has 
stolen her design and has already begun to sell the patented mousetrap.  The patent holder 
files a lawsuit seeking damages for past infringement and an injunction to prevent future 
infringement.  At trial, the patent holder establishes the patent is valid and demonstrates 
infringement of the patent claims by the other party.  In order to receive a permanent 
injunction, the hypothetical patent holder must show four factors.
8
  The first factor 
requires a patent holder to demonstrate irreparable harm.  Prior to the Bosch decision, 
when the patent holder was able to prove her patent was valid and infringed, irreparable 
harm was presumed.  After Bosch, the hypothetical patentee, valid patent and final 
verdict in hand, cannot rely on that presumption and must prove irreparable harm when 
seeking a permanent injunction.   
¶4  This note examines the basis, history, and elimination of the presumption of 
irreparable harm in light of the Bosch decision.  Part II introduces a few general concepts 
related to intellectual property law and then discusses the history of the presumption of 
irreparable harm.  Part III describes the Federal Circuit’s justification in Bosch for the 
elimination of the presumption in the context of a motion for a permanent injunction 
following a successful trial establishing infringement of a valid patent.  Part IV reviews 
the Bosch decision, examines the factors the Federal Circuit suggested, and details some 
factors other courts have applied in the absence of a presumption of irreparable harm in 
patent litigation.  Part V argues that irreparable harm should be presumed based on 
existing case law and the rights envisioned by the Constitution embodied in the patent 
statute.  Finally, Part VI summarizes the main arguments.   
II. BACKGROUND 
¶5  This Part briefly surveys sources of intellectual property rights and the remedies 
available when intellectual property rights are violated.  This Part also describes and 
analyzes the case law that developed in relation to the enforcement of those remedies.   
A. Intellectual Property Rights Generally 
¶6  The Constitution of the United States recognizes some intellectual property rights.9  
The Constitution provides that Congress has the power to pass laws that will promote 
science and useful arts.
10
  Using this Constitutional grant of authority, Congress has 







  While this note focuses 
 
provided by the presumption, and that proof meets the requisite level, the presumption disappears.”); A.C. 
Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1037 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“[A] presumption . . . 
completely vanishes upon the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding of the nonexistence of 
the presumed fact.”). 
8
 See eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 391.  
9
 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (stating that Congress shall have the power “[t]o promote the Progress 
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to 
their respective Writings and Discoveries.”).    
10
 Id.   
11
 See generally, 35 U.S.C. §§ 100–299 (2006) (codifying requirements for patentability, the rights 
associated with patents, and the remedies available for infringement).   
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primarily on patents, a limited understanding of copyright and trademark law is helpful to 
understand and distinguish the presumption of irreparable harm in those types of 
infringement cases. 
1. Patent 
¶7  Patents are issued to protect “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof . . . .”14  Patents are 
only granted if the invention or improvement was previously unknown
15
 and was not 
obvious at the time.
16
  If an inventor thinks her work is useful, novel, and non-obvious, 
she can file an application, which will be examined by the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office.
17
  A patent granted by the USPTO confers an exclusive right “to exclude others 
from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United 
States.”18  Patents are presumed to be valid.19 
2. Copyright 
¶8  A copyright protects works of authorship.20  Generally, this includes books, songs, 
motion pictures, architectural works, and other works of authorship.
21
  Copyrights grant 
exclusive rights to the holder.
22
  Unlike patent rights, there are some limits to an author’s 
 
12
 See generally, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–205 (2006) (codifying the requirements for copyright protection, the 
rights of ownership, and limitations on exclusivity); 17 U.S.C. §§ 501–513 (2006) (codifying copyright 
infringement and the remedies available for infringement).   
13
 See generally, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141 (2006) (codifying the requirements for trademark protection, 
the rights created for trademarks, and the remedies available for infringement).   
14
 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
15
 35 U.S.C §§ 102(a)–(b) (2006). 
16
 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006) (“[T]he differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the 
prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was 
made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.”).  
17
 The application process is controlled by 35 U.S.C. §§ 111–123 (2006). The examination process is 
governed by 35 U.S.C. §§ 131–135 (2006).   
18
 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2006). 
19
 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006).   
20
 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006) (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original 
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from 
which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a 
machine or device.”). 
21
 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006) (“Works of authorship include the following categories: (1) literary 
works; (2) musical works, including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic works, including any 
accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural 
works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural 
works.”).   
22
 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006). 
Subject to sections 107 through 122, the owner of copyright under this title has the 
exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following: (1) to reproduce the 
copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; (2) to prepare derivative works based upon 
the copyrighted work; (3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to 
the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; (4) in the 
case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion 
pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly; (5) in the 
case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, 
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exclusive use of the copyrighted material.
23
  The doctrine of “fair use” is one such 
example.
24
  Because there is considerable flexibility in defining what is fair use, a 
copyright holder does not have the total right to exclude.
25
  Generally, copyrights are 
considered to offer a smaller degree of protection compared to a patent holder’s broader 
right to exclusive use.
26
  This difference helps to explain and distinguish the case law in 
copyright infringement cases from patent cases, which hold that a patentee should be 
entitled to more protections given the total nature of his right to exclude.  Still, the 




¶9  A trademark is “anything which is adopted and used to identify the source or origin 
of goods, and which is capable of distinguishing them from goods emanating from a 
competitor.”28  A trademark is generally used to identify a producer or otherwise identify 
an object or product.
29
  Like patents and copyrights, trademarks are exclusive and are 
considered to create a monopoly.
30
  The Lanham Act, the statute that creates trademark 
rights, provides for registration of trademarks if certain specified requisites are met.
31
  
Trademarks are subject to exclusive appropriation, and the Supreme Court recognized the 
creation of "quasi-property rights" in trademarks.
32
  The rights conferred to a trademark 
holder vary considerably from the rights created by the patent statute.  The underlying 
difference between the bundles of rights associated with trademarks and patents can often 
distinguish cases dealing with the enforcement of those rights, including the injunction 
litigation discussed below. 
B. Remedies for Infringement of Rights 
¶10  Dating back to Marbury v. Madison, the United States Supreme Court has 
recognized an ancient maxim of English law: where there is a right, there is a remedy.
33
  
It therefore follows that when patent, copyright, or trademark rights are infringed, a 
 
graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion picture or other 
audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly; and (6) in the case of sound 
recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio 
transmission.   
Id.  
23
 See generally, 17 U.S.C. §§ 107–112, 117, 119, 121 (2006) (limiting the exclusive rights of the 
copyright holder).   
24
 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).   
25
 See generally, id. (limiting the right to exclude).   
26
 Demetriades v. Kaufman, 680 F. Supp. 658, 662 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).   
27
 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2006) (“Any court having jurisdiction of a civil action arising under this title may 
. . . grant temporary and final injunctions on such terms as it may deem reasonable to prevent or restrain 
infringement of a copyright.”). 
28
 JOHN GLADSTONE MILLS III ET AL., PATENT LAW BASICS § 3:1 (2011).   
29
 Id.   
30
 Id.  
31
 Id.  
32
 Id.  
33
 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 147 (1803) (“It is a settled and invariable principle, that every 
right, when withheld, must have a remedy, and every injury its proper redress.”) (quoting 3 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 109 (1765)).   
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remedy must be available.
34







rights offers certain remedies.  While the remedies vary slightly, this note is limited to 
injunctive relief in patent cases.  Since the presumption of irreparable harm has been 
discussed in preliminary and permanent injunction copyright infringement cases, this 
note also presents the similarities in those cases to provide a more thorough 
understanding of the presumption of irreparable harm.  However, it is important to 
remember that each statute confers slightly different rights.  Often these statutory 
differences, which reach different conclusions regarding the enforcement of those rights, 
can explain and reconcile the different cases. 
C. Relevant Case Law History of Injunctive Relief in Patent, Copyright, and  
Trademark Infringement 
¶11  The patent statute provides several remedies for infringement.38  The statute allows 
for damages and injunctions against infringement.
39
  An injunction is a powerful 
remedy.
40
   
¶12  A substantial advantage of an injunction is contempt proceedings.41  A contempt 
motion is considered a part of the original action, and therefore the adjudged infringer is 
already under the jurisdiction of the court and may be summoned to appear to respond on 
the merits much more quickly.
42
  Further, contempt proceedings do not require a full trial, 
and instead can be decided using motions and affidavits.
43
  If the court chooses to forego 
a full trial, the movant bears the burden of proving violation by clear and convincing 
 
34
 See id. 
35
 “A patentee shall have remedy by civil action for infringement of his patent.”  35 U.S.C. § 281 (2006).  
Further, 35 U.S.C. § 283 provides, “The several courts having jurisdiction of cases under this title may 
grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right secured by 
patent, on such terms as the court deems reasonable.”  35 U.S.C. § 284 provides in part, “Upon finding for 
the claimant the court shall award the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but 
in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer, together with 
interest and costs as fixed by the court.”  
36
 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2006) (“(a) In General.—Except as otherwise provided by this title, an infringer of 
copyright is liable for either—(1) the copyright owner's actual damages and any additional profits of the 
infringer, as provided by subsection (b); or (2) statutory damages, as provided by subsection (c).”).   
37
 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (providing that, “[w]hen a violation of any right of the registrant of a mark . . . shall 
have been established in any civil action arising under this chapter, the plaintiff shall be entitled . . . to 
recover (1) defendant's profits, (2) any damages sustained by the plaintiff, and (3) the costs of the action”).   
38
 See generally, 35 U.S.C. §§ 281–283 (2006) (explaining remedies available for patent infringement). 
39
 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2006). 
40
 Beahringer v. Page, 789 N.E.2d 1216, 1227 (Ill. 2003) (holding that an injunction is an “extraordinary 
remedy which should apply only in situations where an extreme emergency exists and serious harm would 
result if the injunction is not issued.”). 
41
 See KSM Fastening Sys., Inc. v. H.A. Jones Co., 776 F.2d 1522, 1524 (Fed. Cir. 1985), abrogated by 
TiVo Inc. v. EchoStar Corp., 646 F.3d 869 (Fed. Cir. 2011).   
42
 Id. (citing Leman v. Krentler-Arnold Hinge Last Co., 284 U.S. 448 (1932)). 
43
 KSM Fastening Sys., 776 F.2d at 1524.   





  The penalties for contempt—even civil contempt—include fines and 
imprisonment.
45
   
¶13  For example, following an injunction, an enjoined party may try to modify a 
product so that the new product would no longer infringe on the patent.  The patent 
owner may consider the modified product to still be infringing; however, instead of 
having to institute a separate suit to enjoin the new infringement, the patent holder could 
initiate contempt proceedings.  The advantages noted above would enable the patent 
holder to more quickly resolve the new issue, since the infringer would already be under 
the jurisdiction of the court and subject to harsher sanctions.   
¶14  Without an injunction, the patent owner cannot prevent continued infringement.  In 
such a case, the patent owner’s relief is limited to money damages.46  In this way, the 
patent owner is essentially forced to accept a compulsory license arrangement:  the 
infringement cannot be stopped but the patent owner collects an ongoing royalty.
47
   
¶15  In the past, following a successful showing of infringement of a valid patent, a 
permanent injunction was presumed.
48
  One of the first and clearest articulations of this 
standard is W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., wherein the Federal Circuit 
stated, “[t]his court has indicated that an injunction should issue once infringement has 
been established unless there is a sufficient reason for denying it.”49  Applying this 
principle more broadly, the Federal Circuit in Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co. noted, 
“Infringement having been established, it is contrary to the laws of property, of which the 
patent law partakes, to deny the patentee's right to exclude others from use of his 
property.”50  Further, the Federal Circuit stated, “the right to exclude recognized in a 
patent is but the essence of the concept of property.”51  Although not expressly stated, the 
Federal Circuit in Richardson, seems to suggest that not only should there be a 
presumption of an injunction, but in its reading of 35 U.S.C. § 261, injunctions are 
necessary if patents are to confer a meaningful property right.
52
  Not surprisingly, the 
Federal Circuit granted a permanent injunction in Richardson.
53
   
¶16  Despite the rather extreme approach advanced in W.L. Gore & Associates and 
Richardson, there has been a more moderate line of cases suggesting that there is, at the 





 Id.  See 11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: 
CIVIL § 2960 (2d ed.) (1987).  See also Quinter v. Volkswagen of Am., 676 F.2d 969, 974 (3d Cir. 1982); 
A.H. Robins Co., v. Fadely, 299 F.2d 557, 559 (5th Cir. 1962); Fox v. Capitol Co., 96 F.2d 684, 686 (3d 
Cir. 1938). 
45
 KSM Fastening Sys., 776 F.2d at 1524.   
46
 See ALAN L. DURHAM, PATENT LAW ESSENTIALS: A CONCISE GUIDE 14 (3d ed. 2009). 
47
 Id.   
48
 See, e.g., W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 842 F.2d 1275, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 1988); 
Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1246–47 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 853 
(1989). 
49
 W.L. Gore & Assocs., 842 F.2d at 1281. 
50
 Richardson, 868 F.2d at 1246–47.  See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2006) (“Subject to the provisions of this title, 
patents shall have the attributes of personal property.”). 
51
 Richardson, 868 F.2d at 1247 (quoting Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1548 (Fed. 
Cir. 1983)).   
52
 Id.   
53
 Id.   
54
 See Smith Int'l, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 
996 (1983) (holding that “where validity and continuing infringement have been clearly established, . . . 
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The court in Smith International, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co. offered the following 
reasoning: 
The very nature of the patent right is the right to exclude others. Once the 
patentee's patents have been held to be valid and infringed, he should be entitled 
to the full enjoyment and protection of his patent rights. The infringer should not 
be allowed to continue his infringement in the face of such a holding. A court 
should not be reluctant to use its equity powers once a party has so clearly 
established his patent rights. We hold that where validity and continuing 




A subsequent case applied this rule but emphasized that although mere infringement of a 
valid patent is sufficient to show irreparable harm, the presumption can be rebutted by 
clear evidence.
56
  Until 2006, both lines of cases were used and applied in patent cases.
57
   
¶17  In 2006, Justice Thomas delivered the unanimous decision of the Supreme Court in 
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., which held that following a successful trial on the 
merits where infringement was shown, a court could not automatically presume a 
permanent injunction, and instead, the patent holder would have to satisfy the traditional 
equitable elements to receive an injunction.
58
  In eBay, MercExchange alleged that eBay 
infringed on one of its business method patents.
59
  A jury found that MercExhange’s 
patent was valid, eBay had infringed that patent, and an award of damages was proper.
60
  
Following the jury verdict, the district court denied MercExchange’s motion for a 
permanent injunction.
61
  MercExchange appealed the judgment of the district court 
decision to the Federal Circuit.
62
  The Federal Circuit reversed, and applied its “general 
 
immediate irreparable harm is presumed.”); Roper Corp. v. Litton Sys., Inc., 757 F.2d 1266, 1272 (Fed. 
Cir. 1985) (“The presumption rests on a strong showing that a valid patent is being infringed. When that is 
true, irreparable injury may be presumed.”); H.H. Robertson Co. v. United Steel Deck, Inc., 820 F.2d 384, 
390 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“In matters involving patent rights, irreparable harm has been presumed when a clear 
showing has been made of patent validity and infringement.”) (citing Smith Int’l, 718 F.2d at 1581). 
55
 Smith Int'l, Inc., 718 F.2d at 1581. 
56
 In 1985, the Federal Circuit held: 
The presumption does not change the ultimate equitable showing needed to justify a 
preliminary injunction. Like most legal presumptions, it is rebuttable by clear evidence 
that it is overcome in the case at hand. The presumption merely requires that an alleged 
infringer confronted by a patentee's strong showing of validity and infringement bring 
forward evidence that irreparable injury would not actually be suffered by the patentee if 
the motion for preliminary injunction were denied. The presumption rests on a strong 
showing that a valid patent is being infringed. When that is true, irreparable injury may 
be presumed. 
Roper Corp., 757 F.2d at 1272. 
57
 MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rhr’ng and rhr’ng en 
banc denied April 26, 2005, vacated and remanded sub nom. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 
388 (2006). (“We therefore see no reason to depart from the general rule that courts will issue permanent 
injunctions against patent infringement absent exceptional circumstances.”).   
58
 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C., 547 U.S. at 388 (2006).   
59
 Id. at 390.   
60
 Id. at 390–91.   
61
 Id. at 391, (quoting MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695 (E.D. Va. 2003)).   
62
 Id. 
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rule that courts will issue permanent injunctions against patent infringement absent 
exceptional circumstances.”63   
¶18  The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether this rule was 
appropriate.
64
  The Supreme Court rejected the invitation to replace traditional equitable 
considerations with a rule that an injunction automatically follows infringement.
65
  The 
Court rejected categorical approaches, both for providing injunctive relief and denying 
it.
66
  Instead, the Court held that “a plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a 
four factor test” which is derived from equitable principles.67  The Court held that: 
A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) 
that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to 
compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between 
the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the 
public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.
68
   
¶19  Following the eBay decision, the Federal Circuit considered the presumption of 
irreparable harm an open issue.
69
  In 2008, the Federal Circuit decided two cases 
regarding the presumption of irreparable harm.
70
  In Amado v. Microsoft Corp., the 
Federal Circuit did not reach the issue of whether the presumption of irreparable harm 
was intact following the eBay decision.
71
  In Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., the 
Federal Circuit offered the following:  
“It remains an open question ‘whether there remains a rebuttable presumption of 
irreparable harm following eBay,’ Amado v. Microsoft Corp., 517 F.3d 1353, 
1359 n. 1 (Fed. Cir. 2008), but the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
finding irreparable injury here even if Broadcom benefits from no such 
presumption.”72   
Both of these cases demonstrate the question was still unresolved in the Federal Circuit.  
However, following eBay, other Federal Courts of Appeals have eliminated the 





 Id. (quoting MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).   
64
 eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 546 U.S. 1029, 1029 (2005).   
65
 eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 392–93.  See also New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 505 (2001) 
(holding that permanent injunctions do not automatically follow a determination that a copyright has been 
infringed).   
66
 Id. at 394.   
67
 Id. at 391.   
68
 Id.   
69
 See infra notes 7072. 
70
 See Amado v. Microsoft Corp., 517 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 
543 F.3d 683 (Fed. Cir. 2008).   
71
 See Amado, 517 F.3d 1353, 1359 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2008), (“[B]ecause regardless of whether there 
remains a rebuttable presumption of irreparable harm following eBay, the district court was within its 
discretion to find an absence of irreparable harm based on the evidence presented at trial.”).   
72
 Broadcom, 543 F.3d at 702 (Fed. Cir. 2008).   
73
 See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 653 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2011).  The court eliminated the 
presumption of irreparable harm in preliminary injunction proceedings in copyright infringement following 
eBay, despite “repeat[ing] and rel[ying] on this rule numerous times in the nearly three decades since Apple 
Computer, Inc. v. Formula International Inc., 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984)].” Id. at 979.  See also Salinger 
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¶20  In 2010, the Second Circuit eliminated the presumption of irreparable harm for 
preliminary injunction proceedings in copyright cases in Salinger v. Colting.
74
  This case 
made three significant extensions to the general proposition announced in eBay.   
¶21  First, in eBay, MercExchange was seeking a permanent injunction; yet, the Second 
Circuit applied the ruling to a preliminary injunction case.
75
  Second, eBay was a patent 
infringement case; however, the Second Circuit applied the ruling to a copyright 
infringement case.
76
  Finally, and most significantly, while eBay stood for the general 
proposition that the rules of equity would govern the grant of injunctions, the Second 
Circuit read this to mean that eBay had eliminated all presumptions, including the 
presumption of irreparable harm.
77
   
¶22  In 2011, two Ninth Circuit panels also arrived at similar conclusions in copyright 
cases:  eBay had eliminated the presumption of irreparable harm when seeking a 
preliminary injunction in a copyright proceeding.
78
  Since Apple Computer, Inc. v. 
Formula International, Inc., the Ninth Circuit recognized that, in the context of 
preliminary injunctions in copyright cases, a reasonable likelihood of success on the 
merits in a copyright infringement claim raised a presumption of irreparable harm.
79
  
However, this rule was eliminated by the holdings in Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., and 
Flexible Lifeline Systems, Inc. v. Precision Lift, Inc.
80
   
¶23  Most recently, the Fourth Circuit also concluded in a preliminary injunction 
copyright infringement case that the presumption of irreparable harm did not survive the 
eBay decision.
81
  The Fourth Circuit also noted that the “differences [between 
preliminary and permanent injunctive relief] are therefore insufficient to warrant a 
presumption of irreparable harm” in a preliminary injunction.82   
¶24  While the Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits eliminated the presumption of 
irreparable harm in preliminary injunction copyright cases, the First Circuit, in Voice of 
the Arab World, Inc. v. MDTV Medical News Now, Inc., “declined to decide” whether the 
 
v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010) (eliminating the presumption of irreparable harm in preliminary 
injunctions proceedings in copyright infringement actions).   
74
 Salinger, 607 F.3d at 82. 
75
 Id. at 70.   
76
 Id. at 74–75.   
77
 Id.   
78
 See Perfect 10, Inc., 653 F.3d at 980–81 (9th Cir. 2011) (“We therefore conclude that the propriety of 
injunctive relief in cases arising under the Copyright Act must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis in 
accord with traditional equitable principles and without the aid of presumptions or a ‘thumb on the scale’ in 
favor of issuing such relief.”).  See also Flexible Lifeline Sys., Inc. v. Precision Lift, Inc., 654 F.3d 989, 
998 (9th Cir. 2011) (“We conclude that presuming irreparable harm in a copyright infringement case is 
inconsistent with, and disapproved by, the Supreme Court's opinions in eBay and Winter.  Thus, our long-
standing precedent finding a plaintiff entitled to a presumption of irreparable harm on a showing of 
likelihood of success on the merits in a copyright infringement case, as stated in Elvis Presley and relied on 
by the district court, has been effectively overruled . . . . Accordingly, we hold that even in a copyright 
infringement case, the plaintiff must demonstrate a likelihood of irreparable harm as a prerequisite for 
injunctive relief, whether preliminary or permanent.”).   
79
 Salinger, 607 F.3d at 75, (quoting Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int’l, Inc., 725 F.2d 521, 525 (9th 
Cir. 1984)).   
80
 See supra note 78.   
81
 Bethesda Softworks, L.L.C. v. Interplay Entm't Corp., 452 F. App’x 351, 355 (4th Cir. 2011).   
82
 Id. at 355 (“The standard for a preliminary injunction is essentially the same as for a permanent 
injunction with the exception that the plaintiff must show a likelihood of success on the merits rather than 
actual success.”) (citing Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, AK, 480 U.S. 531, 546 n.12 (1987).  
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presumption of irreparable harm was eliminated by the eBay holding.
83
  This case is 
significant because it appears to slightly push back from the trend of eliminating the 
presumption of irreparable harm following eBay.  It should be noted that Voice of the 
Arab World, Inc. was a trademark infringement action and thus distinguishable from the 
copyright cases noted above.
84
 
¶25  Despite the ability to distinguish the Second, Fourth and Ninth Circuits’ holdings as 
copyright infringement cases, the Federal Circuit in Bosch eliminated the presumption of 
irreparable harm in the patent context.  The Bosch decision is significant because it is the 
first time that any of the Federal Courts of Appeal applied the eBay decision to the 
presumption of irreparable harm in patent infringement litigation, and in a case where the 
plaintiff sought a permanent injunction.
85
 
III. DISCUSSION OF ROBERT BOSCH LLC V. PYLON MANUFACTURING CORP. 
A. Underlying Facts 
¶26  Robert Bosch LLC (Bosch) is a subsidiary of Robert Bosch GmbH and is one of 
the world’s largest suppliers of automotive parts.86  Part of Bosch’s business involves 
developing windshield wiper blades.
87
  Bosch holds at least four patents for “beam 
blades,” a type of windshield wiper blade.88  Bosch sued a generic windshield wiper 
blade company, Pylon Manufacturing Corporation (Pylon), for infringing on the four 
patents for beam style wiper blades.  Both parties moved for summary judgment.
89
  On 
summary judgment, the district court determined, inter alia, that Pylon infringed on 
claims 1 and 8 of Bosch patent 6,292,974 (‘974) and that remaining issues should be 
decided by the jury.
90
  The jury determined, inter alia, that claims 13 of both the 
6,944,905 and 6,675,434 (‘905 and ‘434) patents were valid and that Pylon was 
infringing on those claims.
91
  Based on these favorable rulings, Bosch moved for entry of 
a permanent injunction based on the infringement of the valid claims in patents ‘905 and 
 
83
 Voice of the Arab World, Inc. v. MDTV Med. News Now, Inc., 645 F.3d 26, 34–35 (1st Cir. 2011). 
In other words, we decline to decide whether the aforementioned presumption [of 
irreparable harm] is analogous to the ‘general’ or ‘categorical’ rules rejected by the 
Supreme Court in eBay . . . it is unnecessary to decide this question here because—even 
if we assume without deciding that said presumption is good law—we still find that the 
district court abused its discretion in applying the presumption here, in light of the fact 
that such presumption has been held inapplicable in cases where the party seeking 
injunctive relief excessively delays in seeking such relief.  
Id.  
84
 Id. at 37.   
85
 See Robert Bosch LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 659 F.3d 1142 (Fed. Cir. 2011).   
86
 Gabi Thesing, German Business Confidence Fell for a Second Month in April, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 29, 2012, 2:55 PM), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-04-21/german-
business-confidence-fell-for-a-second-month-in-april.html.   
87
 Robert Bosch LLC, 659 F.3d at 1145.   
88
 Id. See also U.S. Patent No. 6,292,974 (filed June 11, 1999); U.S. Patent No. 6,675,434 (filed Feb. 16, 
2001); U.S. Patent No. 6,944,905 (filed April 22, 2002); U.S. Patent No. 6,978,512 (filed May 8, 2002).   
89
 Robert Bosch LLC, 659 F.3d at 1145.  
90
 Id.   
91
 Id. 
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‘434.92  The district court denied that motion on November 3, 2010, holding that Bosch 
failed to prove irreparable harm.
93





¶27  Prior to the Federal Circuit’s decision in Bosch, plaintiffs who had successfully 
proved infringement of a valid patent were entitled to a rebuttable presumption that they 
had suffered irreparable harm, the first element of the four factor test necessary for a 
permanent injunction.
95
   
¶28  The Bosch decision begins its discussion of the presumption of irreparable harm by 
noting that, “In eBay, the Supreme Court made clear that ‘broad classifications’ and 
‘categorical rule[s]’ have no place in this inquiry.”96  Further, the Federal Circuit noted 
that eBay allows courts to “exercise their discretion in accordance with traditional 
principles of equity,” but “[t]he Supreme Court . . . did not expressly address the 
presumption of irreparable harm.”97  The Federal Circuit then clarified the issue by 
definitively stating, “[w]e . . . confirm that eBay jettisoned the presumption of irreparable 
harm as it applies to determining the appropriateness of injunctive relief.”98   
¶29  Immediately following this pronouncement, the Federal Circuit qualified the eBay 
approach: 
Although eBay abolishes our general rule that an injunction normally will issue 
when a patent is found to have been valid and infringed, it does not swing the 
pendulum in the opposite direction.  In other words, even though a successful 
patent infringement plaintiff can no longer rely on presumptions or other short-
cuts to support a request for a permanent injunction, it does not follow that courts 
should entirely ignore the fundamental nature of patents as property rights 
granting the owner the right to exclude.
99
   
The Federal Circuit continued to qualify and limit the eBay approach, noting that the 
Constitution creates a property right in patents that right cannot be ignored.
100
  Moreover, 
the Federal Circuit noted that district courts are not required to “act on a clean slate,” 
meaning that past precedents suggest that injunctions should be granted following a trial 
demonstrating that a valid patent was infringed.
101
  Further, the Bosch opinion quotes the 
concurring opinion of Chief Justice Roberts in eBay, specifically, “‘a page of history is 
 
92
 Id.   
93
 Robert Bosch LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 748 F. Supp. 2d 383, 409 (D. Del. 2010).   
94
 Robert Bosch LLC, 659 F.3d at 1146.   
95
 Id. at 1148. See, e.g., Fisher-Price, Inc. v. Safety 1st, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 526, 528–29 (D. Del. 
2003); Boehringer Ingelheim Vetmedica, Inc. v. Schering-Plough Corp., 106 F. Supp. 2d 696, 701 (D. N.J. 
2000) (entering a permanent injunction after noting that irreparable harm is presumed in patent cases). 
96
 Robert Bosch LLC, 659 F.3d at 1148 (quoting eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 
(2006)).   
97
 Id. at 1148 (quoting eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. at 394).   
98
 Id. at 1149. 
99
 Id.    
100
 Id.   
101
 Id. 
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worth a volume of logic’ when ‘it comes to discerning and applying those standards.’”102  
Based on this language, the Federal Circuit offers what appears to be a slight reversal: 
. . . this court has encountered many cases involving a practicing patentee seeking 
to permanently enjoin a competitor upon an adjudication of infringement . . . we 
have developed certain legal standards that inform the four-factor inquiry and, in 
particular, the question of irreparable harm. While none of these standards alone 
may justify a general rule or an effectively irrebuttable presumption that an 
injunction should issue, a proper application of the standards to the facts of this 
case compels the conclusion that Bosch is entitled to the injunction it seeks.
103
 
This language seems to suggest that while eBay eliminated the rebuttable presumption of 
an injunction, past case law and experience has “developed certain legal standards,” 
including, arguably, a presumption of irreparable harm when an infringing party is 
practicing the invention.
104
  Based upon this reading of the case, it appears that while the 
Federal Circuit has expressly dismissed the presumption of irreparable harm, district 
courts should still allow it to “inform” their decisions, especially when the entity is 
practicing the patent.
105
   
IV. ANALYSIS OF ROBERT BOSCH LLC V. PYLON MANUFACTURING CORP. 
A. Aftermath of the Bosch Decision 
¶30  In reading all the limiting language of the Bosch opinion, it appears that the court, 
while eliminating the presumption of irreparable harm, does not attack the underlying 
premise:  the loss of the right to exclude is an irreparable harm.  However, the loss of the 
right to exclude is not a listed factor in the court’s irreparable harm analysis.  This 
premise is more thoroughly discussed in Part V.  The remainder of this Part examines 
what factors now govern the irreparable harm analysis, assuming that Bosch is not 
overturned or overruled.   
B. What Factors Does Bosch Propose Instead of the  
Presumption of Irreparable Harm? 
¶31  Because the court in Bosch could not rely on the presumption of irreparable harm, 
the court instead looked to various other factors in order to determine whether Pylon’s 
infringement caused irreparable harm.
106
  The court concluded that Bosch provided 
evidence of irreparable harm in three distinct categories: first, the nature of the 
competition between the parties; second, the loss in market share and access to potential 
customers; and third, Pylon’s inability to pay a judgment.107  Each factor is analyzed 
below.   
 
102
 Id. at 1149–1150 (quoting eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. at 395 (Roberts, C.J., 
concurring)).   
103
 Id. at 1150.   
104
 Id.  
105
 Id.   
106
 Id. at 1152–56.    
107
 Id. at 1150. 
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¶32  In Bosch, the Federal Circuit first examined the nature and extent of the 
competition between the parties.
108
  Bosch presented evidence to show it competes with 
Pylon in all of the market segments identified by the parties.
109
  Pylon and Bosch were in 
direct competition, and although there were other infringers in the marketplace, that did 
not negate irreparable harm.
110
   
¶33  The Federal Circuit also held that changes in market share and access to potential 
customers resulting from an introduction of infringing technology can demonstrate 
irreparable harm.
111
  Bosch was able to demonstrate that it lost market share and access to 
potential customers because Pylon was awarded a contract to sell its infringing blades in 
Wal-Mart stores.
112
  Many cases have held that monetary damages cannot adequately 




¶34  Finally, the Federal Circuit held that Pylon’s lack of financial wherewithal to 
satisfy a judgment would be an irreparable harm.
114
  Bosch was able to introduce 
evidence, specifically public financial disclosures, that suggested Pylon was experiencing 
financial difficulty.
115
  Pylon did not rebut that evidence, so the court concluded that 
Pylon would be unable to satisfy a judgment, and therefore held that Bosch would be 
irreparably harmed.
116
   
¶35  Based on Bosch’s demonstration that Pylon directly competed for customers, 
caused a decrease in Bosch’s market share, and that Pylon would be unable to satisfy a 
judgment, the Federal Circuit concluded that Bosch would be irreparably harmed.
117
 
C. Factors that Other Courts Have Considered When Determining  
Irreparable Harm 
¶36  The Bosch opinion provides three potential ways to demonstrate irreparable harm; 
however, there are many alternative ways for patent holders to demonstrate irreparable 
harm.
118
  Other courts have found that a loss of prospective goodwill creates irreparable 
harm.
119





 Id. at 1152.   
110
 Id. at 1151 (quoting Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, 429 F.3d 1364, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2005)) 
(explaining that additional infringers in the marketplace do not negate irreparable harm). 
111
 Id. at 1153–54.   
112
 Id. at 1153. 
113
 See, e.g., Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc. v. Cobalt Pharm. Inc., No. 07–cv–4539, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
119432, at *36–37 (D.N.J. Nov. 10, 2010); Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc., 543 F.3d 1306, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 
2008); TruePosition Inc. v. Andrew Corp., 568 F. Supp. 2d 500, 531 (D. Del. 2008).   
114
 Robert Bosch LLC, 659 F.3d at 1153–54.   
115
 Id. at 1154.   
116
 Id.   
117
 Id. at 1154–55.   
118
 See, e.g., Dominion Video Satellite, Inc. v. Echostar Satellite Corp., 356 F.3d 1256, 1263–64 (10th 
Cir. 2004) (collecting cases which establish irreparable harm).   
119
 See, e.g., Tom Doherty Assocs., Inc. v. Saban Entm't, Inc., 60 F.3d 27, 37–39 (2d Cir. 1995) (loss of 
prospective goodwill through inability to market unique product constituted irreparable harm); 
Basicomputer Corp. v. Scott, 973 F.2d 507, 511–12 (6th Cir. 1992) (violation of covenant not-to-compete 
constituted irreparable harm where damages were difficult to calculate, customer goodwill was damaged, 
and plaintiff suffered loss of competitive position).   
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unique can support a finding of irreparable harm.
120
  Finally, a mere showing of a loss of 
exclusivity may support a finding of irreparable harm.
121
 
V. THERE SHOULD BE A PRESUMPTION OF IRREPARABLE HARM AT LEAST  
IN THE PATENT CONTEXT 
A. Did eBay Eliminate the Presumption of Irreparable Harm? 
¶37  The question of whether eBay eliminated the presumption of irreparable harm is a 
topic of considerable scholarly debate.  One commentator argues that “courts should 
continue to employ the presumption of irreparable harm in trademark infringement cases 
because damages caused by trademark infringement are by their very nature 
irreparable.”122  Further, that commentator argues that the holding of eBay is “capable of 
coexisting with the presumption” of irreparable harm.123  Another commentator states 
that “eBay should be read as preserving a rebuttable presumption of irreparable harm” 
primarily because the availability of injunctions is very important in furthering the goals 
of the patent system.
124
   
¶38  Given the text of the patent statute, the Supreme Court in eBay determined that the 
principles of equity apply to disputes arising under the Patent Act, as noted in 35 U.S.C. § 
283.
125
  However, the Court also announced, “this Court has consistently rejected 
invitations to replace traditional equitable considerations with a rule that an injunction 
automatically follows a determination” of infringement.126  Further, the Court noted that a 
categorical grant of such relief violated the “considerable discretion” district courts are 
supposed to have when deciding whether to grant injunctions.
127
  Afraid that this holding 
would be taken too broadly, the Court limited the rule: “We hold only that the decision 
 
120
 See, e.g., Rent-A-Center, Inc. v. Canyon Television & Appliance Rental, Inc., 944 F.2d 597, 603 (9th 
Cir. 1991) (irreparable harm established because intangibles like advertising efforts and goodwill were 
injured); Ferry-Morse Seed Co. v. Food Corn, Inc., 729 F.2d 589, 592 (8th Cir. 1984) (irreparable harm 
found where company was disadvantaged in competitive market by inability to market unique seed corn); 
Reuters Ltd. v. United Press Int'l, Inc., 903 F.2d 904, 907-09 (2d Cir. 1990) (loss of unique product and 
goodwill supports finding of irreparable harm when customers indicate a strong preference for the product 
and threaten discontinuation of business relationship). 
121
 See, e.g., J.C. Penney Co., Inc. v. Giant Eagle, Inc., 813 F. Supp. 360, 369 (W.D. Pa. 1992) (inherent 
nature of exclusive provision in lease coupled with damage to goodwill, difficulty of calculating damages, 
and unique nature of interest in real estate constituted irreparable harm); Walgreen Co. v. Sara Creek Prop. 
Co., 775 F. Supp. 1192, 1197 (E.D. Wis. 1991) (where exclusivity clause in lease was breached, loss of 
goodwill, erosion of customer base, and diminution of corporate image provided grounds for finding 
irreparable harm), aff'd sub nom. Walgreen Co. v. Sara Creek Prop. Co., B.V., 966 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 
1992).  
122
 Jeffrey M. Sanchez, Comment, The Irreparably Harmed Presumption? Why the Presumption of 
Irreparable Harm in Trademark Law Will Survive eBay and Winter, 2011 BYU L. REV. 535, 538 (internal 
quotes omitted). 
123
 Id.   
124
 Elizabeth E. Millard, Note, Injunctive Relief in Patent Infringement Cases: Should Courts Apply a 
Rebuttable Presumption of Irreparable Harm after eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.?, 52 ST. LOUIS U. 
L.J. 985, 987 (2008).   
125
 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391–92 (2006).   
126
 Id. at 392–93;  see also New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 505 (2001) (following 
copyright infringement, an injunction does not automatically follow).  
127
 eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 394 (citing Roche Prod., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 865 (Fed. 
Cir. 1984)).   
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whether to grant or deny injunctive relief rests within the equitable discretion of the 
district courts, and that such discretion must be exercised consistent with traditional 
principles of equity, in patent disputes no less than other cases governed by such 
standards.”128 
¶39  The eBay decision was joined by two concurring opinions which both seem to 
suggest that injunctions should normally follow, but should not be presumed.
129
  Based 
on these concurring opinions, it can also be argued that the presumption of irreparable 
harm was not disturbed by the majority opinion.   
¶40  In his concurring opinion, Chief Justice Roberts notes that, “[f]rom at least the 
early 19th century, courts have granted injunctive relief upon a finding of infringement in 
the vast majority of patent cases.”130  Further, Roberts notes this tradition of granting 
injunctions is not surprising because remedies consisting entirely of monetary damages 
are generally insufficient to protect a right to exclude, and this difficulty of protecting the 
right to exclude another’s use implicates the first two factors of the traditional four-factor 
test.
131
  Finally, Chief Justice Roberts notes that discretion is not unlimited and courts 
should not start from an “entirely clean slate.”132  Based on the language of this 
concurring opinion, it appears that Chief Justice Roberts did not envision that lower 
courts would use eBay to eliminate the presumption of irreparable harm, since the right to 
exclude “implicates” the first two factors of the traditional test.133   
¶41  Justice Kennedy also filed a concurring opinion which seems to suggest that 
changing times require more discretion on the part of the district court when granting an 
injunction.
134
  His concurring opinion describes an industry which merely uses patents 
“primarily for obtaining licensing fees.”135  The opinion notes that the “threat of an 
injunction” is sometimes used as “undue leverage” and, in those cases, monetary 
damages would sufficiently compensate a non-practicing plaintiff.
136
  This is in harmony 
with the notion of the presumption of irreparable harm.  Specifically, if an infringing 
entity presents evidence that a patent holder was merely using the “threat of an injunction 
as leverage,” then this evidence can be sufficient to rebut the presumption.  Additionally, 
Justice Kennedy notes that the fourth factor in the analysis, whether an injunction serves 






 Id.  
129
 See Id. at 394–95 (Roberts, C.J., concurring); eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 395–97 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring).   
130
 Id. at 395 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).   
131
 Id.   
132
 Id.   
133
 Id.   
134
 Id. at 395–97 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
135




 Id. at 396–97.   
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B. If eBay is Read as Eliminating the Presumption of Irreparable Harm,  
Then It Should be Overruled 
¶42  In assessing whether eBay is sound law, the tension between what rights a patent 
confers and the harm associated with granting an injunction, and thereby excluding 
others, must be more thoroughly examined.  First, it must be noted that the Constitution 
envisions patents as exclusive rights.
138
  In adopting this provision into statutory law, 
Congress clarified in 35 U.S.C. § 261 that patents are to be treated as personal 
property.
139
  Further, the Congress laid out specific remedies for the protection of the 
right conferred by a patent, including the following provision for injunctive relief: “The 
several courts having jurisdiction of cases under this title may grant injunctions in 
accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right secured by 
patent, on such terms as the court deems reasonable.”140   
¶43  If a mere showing of exclusivity may support a finding of irreparable harm, as 
noted in Part II, and patents and copyrights grant exclusive rights, it follows that any 
continued infringement would be irreparable harm, as the holder of the right has lost the 
ability to exclude.  Several cases have discussed this exact issue.  In Hybritech Inc. v. 
Abbott Laboratories, the Federal Circuit noted that, “[t]he patent statute provides 
injunctive relief to preserve the legal interests of the parties against future infringement 
which may have market effects never fully compensable in money.”141  This principle 
was expanded in Reebok International Ltd. v. J. Baker, Inc., where the court noted that, 
“[b]ecause the principal value of a patent is its statutory right to exclude, the nature of the 
patent grant weighs against holding that monetary damages will always suffice to make 
the patentee whole.”142  In Atlas Powder Co. v. Ireco Chemicals, the Federal Circuit 
stated, “[t]he patent statute further provides injunctive relief to preserve the legal interests 
of the parties against future infringement which may have market effects never fully 
compensable in money.”143  Further, in that decision the Federal Circuit noted, “[i]f 
monetary relief were the sole relief afforded by the patent statute then injunctions would 
be unnecessary and infringers could become compulsory licensees for as long as the 
litigation lasts.”144  Based on this statement, it is clear that the Federal Circuit considers 
the right to exclude a right which is independent from the right to receive economic 
benefits.  Accordingly, the separate right to exclude should have some remedy.  While 
equitable principles, including the balance of hardships test, should control the grant of 
an injunction, the loss of the right to exclude is certainly a harm that does not have a 
monetary value.  Thus, following a showing of infringement, irreparable harm should be 
presumed in patent infringement cases.  The Federal Circuit has held that the loss of the 
right to exclude alone is sufficient to establish irreparable harm,
145
 thus the presumption 
of irreparable harm is warranted anytime patent infringement is demonstrated. 
 
138
 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“ . . . the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”).  
139
 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2006) (“Subject to the provisions of this title, patents shall have the attributes of 
personal property.”).   
140
 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2006) (emphasis added).   
141
 Hybritech Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, 849 F.2d 1446, 1456–57 (Fed. Cir. 1988).   
142
 Reebok Int'l Ltd. v. J. Baker, Inc., 32 F.3d 1552, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
143
 Atlas Powder Co. v. Ireco Chemicals, 773 F.2d 1230, 1233 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (emphasis removed). 
144
 Id.   
145
 See, e.g., Hybritech Inc., 849 F.2d at 1456–57; Reebok Int'l Ltd., 32 F.3d at 1557; Atlas Powder Co., 
Vol. 11:2] Matthew C. Darch 
 119 
VI. CONCLUSION 
¶44  The Supreme Court’s decision in eBay has been interpreted by the Federal Circuit 
in Bosch as eliminating all presumptions in injunction litigation, including injunctions in 
patent cases.  This is too broad of a reading of the majority opinion in eBay and discounts 
the additional comments made in the concurring opinions.  The Federal Circuit should be 
reversed, at least in patent infringement injunction litigation.  The factors proposed in 
Bosch are helpful, and certainly more will be developed as new cases are decided, but, 
the exclusive right given to patent holders—a factor which seems like it should be central 
in the analysis—has been marginalized.   
¶45  Not all patent cases where infringement has been proven should result in the grant 
of an injunction.  Instead, courts should still consider the other three traditional factors 
from eBay, and apply a rebuttable presumption of irreparable harm.  The presumption is 
supported by the patent holder’s loss of her “exclusive right” to her invention.  That loss 








773 F.2d at 1233.    
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